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LOIS JENSEN EDWARDS I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MELVIN LEROY EDWARDS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Melvin LeRoy Edwards, 
appeals from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District's order finding the appel-
lant in contempt of court and sentencing the 
appellant to ten days in the Utah County jail, 
ana said court's order denying appellant's 
2 
petition for change of support and alimony 
provisions of the parties• divorce decree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found the appellant 
guilty of contempt and denied his petition 
requesting lowering of child support and 
alimony payments. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that the District 
Court's order should be reversed and his 
petition granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December, 1967, the respon-
dent filed her complaint in the District 
Court of Utah County, State of Utah, asking 
for a divorce from the defendant-appellant. 
On the 10th day of May, 1968, the District 
Court made its order, which in part awarded 
judgment against the appellant in the amount 
of $870.00 for delinquent alimony and support 
3 
payments; ordered the defendant to convey 
all his interest to the parties' home to 
Paul W. Shaffer, the respondent's son by a 
prior marriage; ordered the defendant-appel-
lant to pay $280.00 as child support and 
alimony, said sum to be paid on the last of 
June, and each and every month thereafter. 
On August 5, 1968, the appellant filed 
bankruptcy in the Federal District Court, 
District of Utah. 
On the 21st day of October, 1968, the 
Utah County District Court entered its Decree 
of Divorce which in part: 
(1) Granted the plaintiff-respon-
dent a divorce from the defendant-appellant. 
(2) Granted the plaintiff-respon-
dent custody of the parties' three minor 
children. 
(3) Granted the plaintiff-respon-
dent all the parties' personal property. 
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(4) Ordered the defendant-appel-
lant to pay $60.00 per child per month child 
support and $100.00 per month alimony for a 
total monthly payment of $280.00. 
(5) Ordered the defendant-appel-
lant to save the plaintiff-respondent harmless 
from liability of all debts of the parties. 
On January 22, 1969, the Utah County Dis-
trict Court ordered the appellant to show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt for 
failure to keep his child support and alimony 
payments current and his failure to hold the 
respondent harmless from all the parties' 
debts. 
On or about the 11th day of February, 
1969, the appellant filed his petition 
requesting the District Court to: 
(1) Lower the child support from 
$180.00 per month to $150.00 per month. 
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(2) Release him from any obliga-
tion to pay any alimony. 
(3) Give him custody of the parties' 
children for three months out of each year. 
(4) Release him from any obliga-
tion to pay the parties' debts acquired 
during their marriage. 
On the 15th day of April, 1969, the 
Court heard the above-mentioned appellant's 
petition and respondent's order to show cause. 
On the 2nd day of May, 1969, the Utah 
County District Court made its order which: 
(1) Ordered the defendant-appel-
lant in contempt of court and sentenced him 
to ten days in the Utah County jail; stated 
that he could purge himself of the contempt 
finding by securing a release of the lien 
upon furniture in plaintiff's possession. 
(2) Denied defendant's petition 
for change in support and alimony provisions 
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of the divorce decree. 
(3) Awarded plaintiff judgment 
against the defendant for $75.00 in attorneys 
fees. 
On the 15th day of April, 1969, it was 
agreed in open court by the attorneys for 
the respondent and appeiiant that the appei-
iant was $4B0.66 in arrears for back aiimony 
and child support, and that the appeilant 
had paid $3,166.66 to the respondent since 
May, 1968, to April, 1969, for chiid support 
and alimony, hot including April, 1969 (T. 17). 
Further, on the hearing heid Gn April 15, 
1969, appeiiant testified, and no testimony 
or other evidence was given to contradict 
his testimony, that he had paid or incurred 
monthly debts sihce the date of the divorce 
decree approximately as follows: 
(1) T. 18 Gas for 
of residence is.oo 
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(2) T. 19 Telephone 
bill used in business $ 20.00 
(3) T. 19 Light for 
place of residence 
(4) T. 20 Second-hand 
washing machine payment 
(5) T. 20 Car payment 
on 1958 Plymouth 
(6) T. 21 Utah Central 
Credit Union to pay back money, part 




support or alimony 24.00 
( 7) T. 23 Gas and oil 
for car used to go to work 30.00 
(8) T. 23 Clothing 15.00 
(9) T. 23 Rent for 
place of residence 45.00 
(10) T. 24 Attorney fees 30.00 
(11) T. 24 Car repair 30.00 
(12) T. 23 Food at home 
and on the road while driving truck 
for Pacific Intermountain Express 120.00 
TOTAL OF ABOVE 
MONTHLY BILLS $374.00 
At the above-mentioned hearing, it was 
app. 
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agreed that the appellant owed the following 
obligations ( T. 26, 27) : 
(1) T. 25 Tom Taylor, 
attorney fees $103.00 
(2) T. 25 Lavoy o. 
Taylor, attorney for bankruptcy 250.00 
(3) T. 26 Bankruptcy 
Court 110.00 
( 4) T. 26 Utah Central 
Credit 318.00 
(5) T. 26 Fidelity 
Finance 412.00 
(6) T. 26 Internal 
Revenue Service 149.00 
(7) T. 26 Back support 480.00 
(8) T. 26 Plaintiff-
respondent' s attorney fees 
TOTAL STIPULATED DEBTS 
200.00 
OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT $2222.00 
At the above-mentioned hearing, the 
appellant testified that he would like to 
pay $50.00 a month on the above obligations, 
Which are beyond his regular monthly bills. 
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Thus, the record shows the appellant's 
financial status is as follows: 
INCOME 
Average income per month 
since date of divorce decree $545.00 
EXPENSES 
Average monthly bills and 
living expenses 
Amount appellant would like 
to pay on obligations other 
than monthly bills 
Total monthly expenses 
MONTHLY INCOME 
MONTHLY EXPENSES 
AMOUNT LEFT OVER TO 






(T. 28) $121.00 
Court ordered support 
and alimony of $280.00 
The appellant was for the six months 
preceding the date of the divorce decree 
oarning approximately $650.00 per month take-
home pay (T. 30), and since the divorce, has 
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earned approximately $500.00 per month take-
home pay (T. 27), at his place of employment,. 
Pacific Intermountain Express, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
The appellant's income has dropped in 
the last year due to the fact the respondent 
has garnisheed his wages (T. 55), and the 
fact that he has not had the necessary ready 
cash to make long trips for said employer, 
or the money to pay for his meals or rooms 
on such trips (T. 31); and in fact, on some 
trips, the appellant has not had enough money 
to buy anything to eat or to pay for a place 
to sleep (T. 34). 
At the time the divorce decree was 
entered in this action, the respondent was 
not working (T. 51); at the time of the 
hearing in April,· 1969, the respondent had 
been working for about two months at the Utah 
11 
State Hospital, earning $199.00 take-home 
pay (T. 52). 
The respondent admitted that she had 
been told by the appellant that he would be 
fired from his job if she garnisheed his 
wages, but she did garnishee his wages anyway, 
and she implied or admitted that if he did 
not make his full payments of $280.00 child 
support and alimony, she didn't care if he 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
APPELLANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT. 
The appellant has paid $3,160.00 to the 
respondent for alimony and child support since 
May, 1968, to April, 1969 (T. 17). Further, 
the record of the contempt proceeding is 
replete with evidence indicating that, through 
no fault of his own, the appellant cannot 
afford to pay the amount specified in the decree 
for child support and alimony. The appellant 
has met his burden of showing his inability 
to pay. DeYonge v. DeYonge, 103 Utah 410, 
135 P.2d 905 (1943). In order to hold appel-
lant in contempt, it must be shown that he 
was either able to pay or willfully refused 
to comply with the order of the court. In 
absence of such a finding, the order is void. 
Jd. at 413, 135 P.2d at 906. Appellant had 
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made his best efforts to pay (T. 17), but 
is presently unable to do so (T. 18-26) . 
l\ppellant further argues that under the evi-
dence, it is conclusively shown that in spite 
of his best efforts at all times, he was 
unable to comply with the court's order to 
pay $280.00 per month to his wife. In Limb 
v. Limb, 113 Utah 385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948), 
the court states: 
If appellant is correct as to 
the effect of his testimony, 
then he was not guilty of con-
tempt for a person who puts 
forth every reasonable effort 
to comply with a court order 
and still is unable to do so, 
is not guilty of contempt on 
account of such failure. Id. 
at 389, 195 P.2d at 265. 
The appellant testified that his average 
take-home pay is $ 500. 00 since the divorce 
decree (T. 27, 49) . His average monthly bills 
unci expenses are $ 3 74. 00 (T. 18-26) . Appel-
l 0nt would like to pay $50.00 per rnonth toward 
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the $2,222.00 debt which he owes (T. 27-28). 
This leaves the amount of $76.00 a month to 
pay the $280.00 that was decreed (T. 28). 
This is ample evidence of his inability to 
pay. And in light of the fact that he has 
put forth every reasonable effort to comply 
with the order, the appellant should be able 
to purge himself of contempt. As the court 
in Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P.2d 
103 (1959) said 11 ••• because his failure to 
pay the $100 had not been wilful, 11 he was not 
in contempt. Id. at 239, 342 P.2d at 104. 
These two requirements, i.e., (1) inability 
to pay and ( 2) reasonable effort to pay, have 
been established in this case. The appellant 
has met his burden. The trial court erred in 
finding him in contempt. A reasonable effort 
lo comply is not con tempt. Ozmus v. Ozmus, 
114 Utah 216, 222, 198 P.2d 233, 236 (1948). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN COM..MITTING THE APPELLANT TO JAIL FOR TEN 
DAYS UNLESS HE SECURE A RELEASE OF A LIEN 
UPON FURNITURE IN RESPONDENT'S POSSESSION. 
A judgment for contempt for failure to 
comply with an alimony and support order must 
be based upon a finding of fact that the former 
husband is able to pay or that he willfully 
refuses to comply with the order, and in the 
absence of such finding, the judgment is void. 
DeYonge v. DeYonge, 103 Utah 410, 135 P.2d 
905 (1943). It was not within the discretion 
of the trial court to commit appellant to jail 
for contempt unless he secure a release of a 
lien upon furniture in respondent's possession. 
'rhere was no finding that the appellant was 
able to pay, nor was there a finding that he 
Willfully refused to pay. In the absence of 
such finding, the judgment of contempt is void, 
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and the trial court cannot "allow" appellant 
to purge himself of a void contempt charge. 
It is clear from the record that appellant 
was not able to meet his payments, but that 
he made every reasonable effort to pay what 
he could (T. 17, 18-26). 
Furthermore, the trial court's order 
that he secure a release or be found in con-
tempt, in effect, rendered the bankruptcy 
decree void. The obligation on the furniture 
had been discharged in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding four months before the divorce decree 
had been entered. The trial court cannot now 
order a debt to be paid which has been legally 
discharged. This argument is further empha-
sized in Point IV. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF THE 
DIVORCE DECREE TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY 
AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYABLE BY THE APPELLANT 
17 
TO THE RESPOI\TDENT. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE POINT AT ISSUE. 
Utah law allows the court, or petition 
by the parties, to change the amount of alimony 
and child support from time to time. 
When a decree of divorce is made, 
the court may make such orders 
in relation to the children, pro-
perty, and parties, and the main-
tenance of the parties and children, 
be equitable, .Such 
subsequent changes or new orders 
may be made by the court with 
respect to the disposal of the 
children or the distribution of 
property as shall be reasonable 
and proper. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5 (1953). (emphasis added). 
This statute, which makes the determina-
tion for modification an equitable proceeding, 
has been construed ". .to empower the court 
to make a modification where there has been 
substantial change in the material circum-
stRnccs of either one or both of the parties 
since the decree was entered." Sorensen v. 
20 Utah 2d 360, 361, 438 P.2d 180, 
18 
181 (1968). Further, it must be shown that 
the husband has not caused or contributed 
to the 11 • • • existence of the grounds for 
which modification is sought. 11 Ibid. 
Appellant has met his burden of showing 
substantial change both on his part and on 
the part of his wife. He has not caused the 
changes. Since the divorce decree, the 
appellant's take-home pay has dropped from 
$650.00 per month to $500.00 per month (T. 
30, 49). This has come about through no 
fault of his own. 
Q. {by Mr. Peterson) Are 
you telling us now you will 
earn less money this year 
than you did last year? 
A. I am earning less money 
this year than last year. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Circumstances beyond my 
control. I don't know why it 
is. 
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Q. What are those cir-
cumstances? 
A. I don't get called out 
to work as often as I used 
to. I don't know what their 
changes have been or business 
conditions or what, but I am 
not just making the money this 
year that I did last year at 
this time (T. 46). 
Furthermore, the respondent's earnings 
have increased from zero to $199.80 per 
month, take-home pay, through no fault of 
appellant's (T. 52). In Sorensen, Supra, 
the court said that the fact the wife owned 
- . . -
property which had increased in value after 
the alimony decree was an important consider-
ation for determining changed conditions. 
19_. at 361, 438 P.2d at By analogy, 
the fact that the wife's income has increased 
is also substantial evidence of change in 
natural circumstances. This ground is clearly 
shown in the record. (T. 52) 
20 
The change sought by the appellant is 
both reasonable and proper in light of the 
changed conditions. Since the hearing on 
the petition for modification of alimony and 
child support is an equitable proceeding, 
the court should closely scrutinize the 
situation and apply equitable remedies. 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d at 361, 438 
P.2d at 180. The appellant, after deducting 
his expenses, has $76.00 left with which to 
pay the decreed amount of $280.00 (T. 18-28, 
49) . He has requested the court to lower the 
child support from $180.00 a month to $150.00, 
and to relieve him from any alimony. This is 
reasonable in light of the facts that (1) 
since the time the decree was entered, the 
appellant has taken a $150.00 deduction per 
month in take-home pay, and (2) the respondent 
now earns almost $200.00 per month. At the 
21 
time of the decree, she was earning zero 
(T. 52) . There is evidence that the appel-
lant has had to borrow money to pay the 
support (T. 22). The appellant has made 
every reasonable effort to pay the support 
and wishes to continue to pay what he can. 
If he is required to continue to pay the 
$280.00, eventually the respondent may not 
get any support because appellant could very 
well lose his job because of the garnishment 
(T. 55), and may not be able to borrow any-
more money. Equity demands that the respon-
dent should receive support. But equity al'so 
demands that the appellant should not be 
forced to go further in debt to meet his 
obligations. 
The circumstances of both parties have 
changed, and they have changed beyond appel-
lant 1 s control. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
22 
(1953) permits subsequent changes from th2 
clivorce decree which are reasonable and proper. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is evident that 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
application for modification of the divorce 
decree to reduce ·the amount payable as alimony 
and child support. 
-POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
DIVORCE DECREE TO RELIEVE HIM OF THE OBLIGA-
TION TO PAY THE PARTIES 1 DEBTS. 
Inherent in this argument is the question 
of whether the divorce court can, after bank-
ruptcy, hold the wife harmless from liability 
of the parties' debts incurred before the 
bankruptcy. The appellant admits that alimony 
and child support are not dischargeable debts 
Under a bankruptcy decree. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35. 
It is also not contended that any debts 
incurred after the bankruptcy are discharged, 
23 
and the court is within its power to hold 
the wife harmless for such debts. However, 
where the husband has been decreed bankrupt 
prior to his divorce, the divorce court 
cannot reinstate his obligations which have 
already been discharged by the bankruptcy 
referee. "A discharge in bankruptcy shall 
release a bankrupt from all his provable 
debts. II 11 U.S.C.A. § 35. The appellant 
was adjudged bankrupt on August 5, 1968. On 
October 21, 1968, the Utah County District 
Court entered its decree of divorce. Besides 
the alimony and child support, the court 
ordered the appellant to hold the respondent 
harmless from liability of all the debts of 
llie parties. This decree in effect renders 
the bankruptcy null and void as to those 
debts discharged by the referee. 
There are cases holding that the bank-
ruptcy does not discharge obligations 
24 
relating to the wife's maintenance and 
support, i.e., liabilities incurred by the 
husbund and wife. Erickson v. Beardall, 
20 Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 (1968) i In 
Re Baldwin, 250 F. Supp. 533 (1966). However, 
in these cases, the bankruptcy was effected 
after the divorce decree. The petitions 
were for review of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Here, the bankruptcy occurred before the divorce 
decree, and there is no dispute that the bank-
ruptcy referee rightfully discharged the 
obligations. 
The decree should have been modified 
to exclude the order to hold the respondent 
harmless. The trial court erred in denying 
the appellant's petition for modification 
of said order. 
25 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's order holding the 
appellant in contempt should be reversed. 
The appellant requests the following be 
' granted: (1) that his child support pay-
rnents be lowered to $150.00 per month; (2) 
that he be relieved of any obligation to pay 
alimony; (3) that he be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the parties' debts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
z;.CZ:#/ 
LAVOY O. TAYLOR 
Attorney at Law 
3069 South 2910 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
